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Constitutionality Without Wisdom: Caplin
& Drysdale and Monsanto Examined
Introduction
On June 22, 1989, the United States Supreme Court handed down
decisions in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States ' and its com-
panion case, United States v. Monsanto.2 In these cases, the Court ex-
amined the statutory and constitutional issues raised by the forfeiture
provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)' and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute (CCE).4 Spe-
cifically, the Court considered whether the provisions extend to include
assets that a defendant wishes to use to pay an attorney.
The forfeiture provisions embodied in the RICO and CCE statutes
authorize a preconviction restraining order freezing a defendant's poten-
tially forfeitable assets. The threshold question in this area is whether
these provisions create an exemption by which some or all of a criminal
defendant's assets may be used to retain private counsel. Commentators
are split on this issue: some interpret the language of the statutes and
congressional intent to exempt legitimate attorneys' fees from the provi-
sions,5 while others find that the statutes unambiguously include all as-
1. 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
2. 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). RICO was originally Title IX of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 901-904, 84 Stat. 941 (1970),
amended Pub. L. No. 95-575, § 3(c), 92 Stat. 2465 (1978); Pub. L. 95-598; Title III, § 314(b),
92 Stat. 2677 (1978).
4. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Originally, CCE was part of Title II of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat.
1265 (1970).
5. See Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE and the Right to
Counsel of Choice. The Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV.
765 (1989) (construe statutes to avoid an unconstitutional interpretation); Note, Forfeiture of
Attorneys' Fees in RICO and CCE Cases: A Denial of Due Process and the Right to Choice of
Counsel, 74 IowA L. REv. 249 (1988) (unlikely that Congress intended the provisions to in-
clude legitimate attorneys' fees); Comment, The Constitutionality of Attorney Fee Forfeiture
Under RICO and CCE, 22 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 155 (1988) [hereinafter Comment, Constitu-
tionality of Fee Forfeiture] (interpreting provisions as exempting legitimate attorneys' fees ful-
fills statutory purpose and does not violate sixth amendment rights); Note, Attorney Fee
Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: If It Works, Don't Fix It, 63 No-
[659]
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sets and provide no exemption for attorneys' fees.6 Legislative history is
unclear on this point.7
A conclusion that the statutes8 make no exemption for attorneys'
fees leads to a second inquiry regarding the constitutional issues raised by
such a reading. Again commentators disagree. Some argue that to in-
clude all assets in a preconviction forfeiture order renders the defendant
constructively indigent and without the resources to retain private coun-
sel, thus violating both the defendant's sixth amendment right to choice
of counsel and fifth amendment due process rights.9 Others argue that
the sixth amendment right to counsel is not absolute; as long as the de-
fendant has effective counsel his or her rights are not violated.'" Both
sides cite the history of civil and criminal forfeiture in this country to
bolster their fifth amendment claims."
These issues are significant because the potential repercussions are
so great. The adversarial system as we know it may undergo vast change
if prosecutors, as a legal strategy, can impair the ability of defendants to
retain counsel of their choice. In addition, the way we approach these
issues will shed light on what this country considers to be acceptable
limits in its efforts to battle racketeering or drug-related crime.
Prior to Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto, questions concerning at-
torneys' fee forfeiture had been arising with increasing frequence' in fed-
TRE DAME L. REV. 535 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Attorney Fee Forfeiture] (language of statute
leaves the issuance of restraining orders to the court's discretion).
6. See, eg., Brickey, Attorneys' Fees Forfeitures: On Defining "What" and "When" and
Distinguishing "Ought" From "Is", 36 EMORY L.J. 761 (1987) (plain language of the statute
encompasses attorneys' fees).7. See infra notes 83-88, 98-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases that
adopt a statutory construction of the forfeiture provisions as exempting attorneys' fees. Other
courts read the statute as clear in its intent to include attorneys' fees. See infra notes 82, 93,
101-103, 107-117 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases that find this statute to be
constitutional. See infra notes 91, 94, 104-105, 118-25 and accompanying text for a discussion
of cases that characterize the statute as unconstitutional.
8. As amended by the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§§ 302-303, 98 Stat. 2040 (1984), the RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions are virtually identi-
cal. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) with 21 U.S.C. § S53 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986). Thus, a forfeiture provision discussion applies to both the RICO and CCE statutes
unless otherwise indicated.
9. See Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an Institutional Role Theory to
Define Individual Constitutional Rights, 1987 WIs. L. Rn-v. 1 (fee forfeitures violate a defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to choice of counsel); Comment, RICO and the Forfeiture of
Attorneys' Fees: Removing the Adversary From the Adversarial System?, 62 WASH. L. REV. 201
(1987) (fifth amendment due process rights mandate that attorneys' fees be exempt from forfei-
ture); Pate, Payment of Attorneys' Fees With Potentially Forfeitable Assets, 22 CRIM. L. BULL.
326 (1986) (forfeiture of attorneys' fees not unconstitutional provided defendant given oppor-
tunity to demonstrate legitimacy of assets).
10. See Brickey, supra note 6.
11. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
eral district and circuit courts. 2 What had emerged was an amalgam of
holdings based on various statutory interpretations of the forfeiture pro-
visions. 3 This conflict in decisions among the circuits, epitomized by In
re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale4 and United States v.
Monsanto, 5 led the United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari to
consider fee forfeitute. 6
The Caplin & Drysdale holding in the Fourth Circuit favors a statu-
tory interpretation that forfeitable assets include attorneys' fees. 17 More-
over, the court's constitutional analysis found that the statute does not
interfere with a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. "'8 This en
bane rehearing reversed a panel decision 9 affirming the district court's
interpretation of the statute as exempting attorneys' fees.20
In contrast, the Second Circuit found in Monsanto that restrained
assets could be used to fund reasonable attorneys' fees.2 An earlier
panel decision22 ordered that the issuance of a pretrial restraining order
freezing a defendant's assets must be accompanied by a hearing to deter-
mine the probability that the assets are forfeitable.23 Should the Govern-
ment meet this burden, however, attorneys' fees would not be exempt
from the forfeiture order.24 The appellate court's en bane rehearing,
which reversed the panel decision and permitted the payment of legiti-
mate attorneys' fees from restrained assets in all circumstances,2" issued
a per curiam opinion reflecting a number of rationales for the decision.26
In affirming Caplin & Drysdale2 7 and reversing Monsanto,2 8 the ma-
jority in a closely divided United States Supreme Court29 adopted a stat-
12. See infra notes 82-125 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
14. 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en band), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
15. 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988) (en bane) (per curiam), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
16. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2661 (1989).
17. 837 F.2d at 641.
18. Id. at 649.
19. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), afftg United States v.
Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va. 1986), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
20. Id at 913.
21. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1402 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc) (per
curiam), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
22. United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.), rev'd 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988)
(en bane) (per curiam), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
23. Id at 82-83.
24. Id at 85.
25. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1402.
26. The court issued a per curiam order followed by eight separate concurring and dis-
senting opinions.
27. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2649 (1989).
28. United States v. Monsanto, 109. S. Ct. 2657, 2661 (1989).
29. Justice White wrote the majority opinion. He was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy.
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utory construction that mandates the forfeiture of all restrained assets.3"
Turning to constitutional considerations, the Court rejected the argu-
ment that pretrial forfeiture of assets which prevents a defendant from
retaining private counsel violates both a defendant's right to counsel of
choice and right to due process under the Sixth and Fifth Amendments,
respectively.
31
In a separate opinion that addressed both the Caplin & Drysdale and
Monsanto majority opinions, the dissenters32 favored a statutory con-
struction that would have permitted the Court to avoid reaching the con-
stitutional issues at all.33 Even if Congress had intended the statute to
have the meaning the majority placed upon it, the dissenters argued, such
an interpretation would be unconstitutional because it would violate the
Sixth Amendment.34
This Comment discusses the United States Supreme Court decisions
in Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto. Part I examines the statutory lan-
guage in the forfeiture provisions of RICO and CCE and considers
whether legislative history reveals congressional intent concerning fee
forfeiture. Part II takes a brief look at the various interpretations of the
provisions in the courts, focusing on the Caplin & Drysdale and Mon-
santo appellate decisions. Against this background, Part III analyzes the
reasoning used by both the majority and dissent in their Supreme Court
opinions. Part IV weighs these arguments and, finding the dissenting
arguments more persuasive, suggests possible future directions for the
United States Supreme Court, Congress, and society in general.
I. Legislative History
A. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and the
Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute
In 1970, Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act and
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. The Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Contin-
uing Criminal Enterprise Statute (CCE) originate in these Acts.
Congress acted in direct response to the growing awareness that tradi-
tional law enforcement measures were less than effective against the
30. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2661-65; Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2650-51. Issues of
statutory construction are discussed in greater detail in the Monsanto opinion. Although the
Court rejects the petitioner's statutory interpretation in Caplin & Drysdale, it expressly refers
to the explanation in Monsanto.
31. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2651-57; Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2665-67. Constitu-
tional issues are dealt with in greater detail in the Caplin & Drysdale opinion. The Court does,
however, reject the constitutional claims in Monsanto as well.
32. 109 S. Ct. at 2667 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Ste-
vens joined Justice Blackmun's dissent.
33. Id at 2667.
34. Id
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modern35 types of crime emerging across the nation.36 Specifically, Con-
gress aimed to cripple the strong economic incentives in organized crime
and drug distribution activities.37
As a result, both RICO and CCE contain provisions for heavy fines
and long prison terms. 38 RICO is directed against persons engaging in a
"pattern of racketeering activity" 39 to invest in, control, or conduct an
"enterprise"'  and is the weapon of choice against organized crime."
CCE, called the "RICO drug statute" by one commentator,42 targets
large-scale drug operations. 43
35. See Blakey, Forfeiture of Legal Fees: Who Stands to Lose, 36 EMORY L.J. 781, 783-84
(1987). Blakey discusses the "law of the nineteenth century" as being directed at individual
actors and their victims. He postulates that modem law enforcement must evolve to contend
with "organizational crime" which has at its base a large number of perpetrators acting within
an organization to reach a greater number of victims.
36. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1969) [hereinafter S. REP. 617] ("our pres-
ent laws are inadequate to remove criminal influences from legitimate endeavors or organiza-
tions"); see also S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1985), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3374-76 [hereinafter S. REP. 225] (discussing the intent
behind the original RICO and CCE provisions); Statement of Findings and Purpose, Organ-
ized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1073 ("It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organ-
ize crime in the United States ... by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing
enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in
organized crime.").
37. S. REP. 617 at 79 ("an attack must be made on their source of economic power itself,
and the attack must take place on all available fronts.").
38. RICO convictions carry penalty provisions providing for fines up to $25,000 and up to
20 years of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a). CCE convictions carry fines of up to $100,000
for the first conviction and a prison sentence of 10 years to life. For subsequent convictions, a
fine may be levied of up to $200,000 and a prison sentence of 20 years to life. 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(a).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1962. A "pattern of racketeering activity" is broadly defined as two or
more related "acts of racketeering occurring within a ten-year period." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
"Acts of racketeering" include acts or threats of violent crimes such as arson, murder, kidnap-
ping, robbery, and extortion. In addition, acts or threats of white-collar crimes such as federal
mail or wire fraud, bankruptcy fraud, and securities fraud also fall under the RICO net. 18
U.S.C. § 1961(1).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1962. The definition of "enterprise" is not restricted to formally struc-
tured legal entities such as businesses or associations; it also includes any informal group
whose members are connected through their participation in related acts of illegal activity. 18
U.S.C. § 1961(4).
41. The statute's reach is not limited to mobsters, however. The language of the statute
has been broadly construed to include white-collar criminals, and there have been an increas-
ing number of prosecutions under RICO against these nontraditional "racketeers." Note, Con-
stitutional Law-The Eighth Amendment as Applied to RICO Criminal Forfeiture-United
States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987), 10 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 393, 396-400
(1988).
42. Blakey, supra note 35, at 783.
43. 21 U.S.C. § 848. The statute is aimed at persons committing a series of drug viola-
tions who occupy "a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of
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Honoring the commitment to move beyond conventional sanctions
in this new phase of the war on crime, Congress included forfeiture pro-
visions in RICO and CCE.4 Although civil forfeiture has been used ex-
tensively in the United States, criminal forfeiture has had only a very
limited use.45 Criminal forfeiture is an in personam proceeding against
the owner of potentially forfeitable property that requires a finding of
guilt before forfeiting the property."6 Civil forfeiture, on the other hand,
is an in rem proceeding against the property itself. The property may be
forfeited even after the acquittal of its owner because civil forfeiture em-
braces the legal fiction that the property itself is the guilty party in the
action.47 Through the increasing use of criminal forfeiture to strike at
the economic power bases of modem crime, Congress hoped "to remove
the profit from organized crime by separating the racketeer from his dis-
honest gains."
48
The initial impact was not as great as Congress had anticipated. In
the ten years after the implementation of the provisions, only ninety-
eight cases were filed under the RICO and CCE statutes.49 The reasons
for this were multifold. The Justice Department's slow response in fa-
miliarizing itself with the new regulations has been cited as one cause.5"
management" over five or more other persons engaged in the same activities. 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(b).
44. The original forfeiture provisions were found in 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982) and 21
U.S.C. § 848 (1982). The RICO provisions demanded the forfeiture of "any interest... ac-
quired or maintained" in violation of the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(aXl). The CCE provisions
required the forfeiture of "the profits obtained" in violation of the statute. 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(a)(2)(A).
45. United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1487 (10th Cir. 1988) (rejection of criminal
forfeiture in the early years of our nation); United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 873 (3d Cir.
1987) (use in England set an example to avoid). Except for a short period during the civil war
when criminal forfeiture was used as a punishment for treason, criminal forfeiture was not
used in the United States until its recent revival under RICO and CCE. Note, Attorney Fee
Forfeiture, supra note 5, at n.32; Wade, Feds in Your Pocket: Attorney's Fee Forfeiture and
Attorney Disqualification Under RICO, 10 CRiM. JusT. J. 217, 226 (1988) (quoting United
States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 241 (E.D. Cal. 1982));" Markus, Procedural Implications of
Forfeiture Under RICO, the CCE, and the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: Reforming
the Trial Structure, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 1097, 1103-1105 (1986); see also Note, RICO Forfeiture:
Can the Adversary Be Removed From the Adversary Process?, 35 DE PAUL L. REv. 709, 712-13
(1986) [hereinafter Note, RICO Forfeiture].
46. Markus, supra note 45, at 1105-1106; Comment, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under
RICO: An Affront to a Defendant's Right to Counsel and to a Fair Trial, 12 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 553, 558 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Forfeiture Under RICO] (forfeiture "inextricably
linked" with defendant's guilt).
47. Markus, supra note 45, at 1105.
48. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 28 (1983).
49. U.S. Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, Asset Forfeiture-A Seldom
Used Tool in Combatting Drug Trafficking, at 10 (1981) [hereinafter GAO Report].
50. Blakey, supra note 35, at 787-88. See also GAO Report, supra note 49, at 16 ("The
Department of Justice has simply not exercised the kind of leadership and management neces-
sary to make asset forfeiture a widely used law enforcement technique.").
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Much of the fault, however lies with Congress and the construction of
the statutes themselves. Ambiguous language and the lack of procedural
direction plagues the forfeiture provisions.5" The courts had difficulty
interpreting what Congress meant by "interest" and "proceeds" and, as a
result, frequently construed the provisions narrowly.52
The ability of defendants to dissipate the proceeds of their crimes
prior to conviction created even more of a problem because the statutes
failed to define the standards regarding the issuance of preconviction re-
straining orders. Without consistent procedural standards to follow, the
statutes were rarely implemented in the manner envisioned by Con-
gress.5 3 The failure of the provisions to include a procedure that would
permit the issuance of a restraining order during the preindictment pe-
riod proved particularly fatal.5" Defendants had plenty of time to trans-
fer or conceal their assets, thereby mitigating the effects of the provisions.
B. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984
To address the shortcomings of the original forfeiture provisions,
Congress passed the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 (CFA).55
According to one commentator, "the Act contains the most significant
changes in the federal criminal justice system ever instituted at one
time."5 6 The CFA left the original penalty provisions untouched. In-
stead, Congress added new forfeiture provisions in an attempt to rectify
51. See generally Note, RICO Forfeiture, supra note 45, at 717-19 (discussing the statu-
tory limitations of the original forfeiture provisions).
52. GAO Report, supra note 49, at 30; see also S. REP. No. 225, supra note 36, at 195 (the
interpretation by some courts results in the failure to reach criminal profits); Blakey, supra
note 35, at 788 ("The federal judiciary came to the statutes as a country parson reading the
first chapter of Genesis-with a dry and hostile literalism."). The question confronting the
courts was whether the statute could be read expansively to include the indirect proceeds of
criminal activity in addition to the direct profits that all courts agreed were forfeitable. The
Supreme Court put this issue to rest in Russello v. United States when it held that the language
of the statute was to be liberally construed to include both direct profits and derivative pro-
ceeds obtained by illegal activity. 464 U.S. at 16, 22.
53. S. REp. 225, supra note 36, at 195. The effect of the limited interpretation placed
upon the forfeiture provisions has been to "seriously undercut the statute's utility and signifi-
candy limit the extent of RICO forfeitures." IM
54. Id at 195 ("present criminal forfeiture statutes do not adequately address the serious
problem of a defendant's pretrial disposition of his assets.").
55. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1984) and
adding 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1984)). The forfeiture provisions that create the CFA are Chapter III
of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
The CFA repealed 21 U.S.C. § 848(d), the original CCE forfeiture provision, and amended 21
U.S.C. § 848(a) of the statute to subject those convicted of CCE violations to the newly added
21 U.S.C. § 853. In addition, the CFA modified 18 U.S.C. § 1963, RICO's original forfeiture
provision. The new forfeiture provisions, 21 U.S.C. § 853 and modified 18 U.S.C. § 1963,
essentially replicate each other and are treated as interchangeable for the purposes of interpre-
tation by the courts.
56. Wade, supra note 45, at 217.
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what many in Congress saw as the most grievous flaw in the original
provisions: the failure to mount a strong attack on the economic power
bases of crime.5 7 To accomplish this goal, Congress clarified the defini-
tion of property subject to forfeiture,58 added a relation-back provision
that vests title in the government as of the time an offense is committed,5 9
eased procedures connected with the issuance of restraining orders,' and
established a process whereby bona fide purchasers could challenge the
forfeiture of specific assets.61
The CFA amended RICO and CCE to clarify that the indirect pro-
ceeds of criminal activity are subject to forfeiture along with the direct
proceeds.62 These amendments affirmed an earlier decision by the
Supreme Court that broadly defined the original provisions as including
both direct and indirect proceeds.63 In addition, Congress described the
types of property subject to forfeiture" with a far-reaching intent.65
In an attempt to prevent the preconviction dissipation of assets by a
defendant, Congress added a relation-back provision to the CFA and
simplified the procedure for obtaining preconviction restraining orders.66
The original provisions did not give the government any rights to poten-
tially forfeitable assets until the defendant's conviction.67 Under the
CFA provisions, title to forfeitable property vests in the government as of
57. S. REP. 225, supra note 36, at 196 (Congress intended the new forfeiture provisions
"to preserve the availability of a defendant's assets for criminal forfeiture, and, in those cases
in which he does transfer, deplete, or conceal his property, to assure that he cannot as a result
avoid the economic impact of forfeiture.").
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3); 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 19630); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n); see also Comment, Constitutionality of Fee
Forfeiture, supra note 5, at 159-62; Note, Attorney Fee Fofeiture, supra note 5, at 539-43;
Comment, Forfeiture of Attorney Fees Under RICO's New Amendments, 32 ST. Louis U.LJ.
199, 203-207 (1987); Comment, Forfeiture Under RICO, supra note 46, at 559-63; Pate, supra
note 9, at 328-33; Note, RICO Forfeiture, supra note 45, at 720-26.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3); 21 U.S.C. § 853(a). Both statutes define forfeitable property
as: "any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained,
directly or indirectly" in violation of either the RICO or CCE statute. Id
63. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983) ("statute was intended to provide
new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and its economic
roots"); see also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b); 21 U.S.C. § 853(b) (includes real property, tangible personal
property, and intangible personal property such as "rights, privileges, interests, claims, and
securities").
65. S. REP. 225, supra note 36, at 200 (what is meant to be encompassed by the term
property should be "broadly construed").
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) and (d); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) and (e).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c); 21 U.S.C. § 848(d).
the time the criminal activity takes place,6" and includes property the
defendant has transferred to third parties.6 9 To reduce third-party trans-
fers prior to conviction, Congress authorized the issuance of postindict-
ment and preindictment restraining orders. Postindictment orders do
not require a hearing and may be based upon the information provided in
the indictment.70 Preindictment orders may be obtained at an adversary
hearing upon a showing that: (1) "there is a substantial probability that
the United States will prevail on the issue of forfeiture;" and that (2) "the
need to preserve the availability of the property"71 outweighs any hard-
ship that the defendant may suffer. Temporary preindictment restraining
orders may be obtained ex parte upon a showing of probable cause that
the assets specified would be subject to forfeiture.72 Hearings concerning
the issuance of restraining orders use relaxed evidentiary rules which per-
mit a government showing based on hearsay.73
Congress attempted to protect innocent third parties from the reach
of the provisions by permitting bona fide purchasers to challenge forfei-
ture in a postconviction hearing.7 4 The third party- must petition the
court and establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she
received title before the occurrence of the defendant's alleged violation.75
Alternatively, if the transfer occurred after the violation, at a time when
title in the government had already vested, it must be shown that the
transfer from the defendant was made for value and that the purchaser
had no reason to believe at the time of the transfer that the property was
subject to forfeiture.76 If third parties meet their burden, the forfeiture
order will be amended to exclude the property in question.
The new forfeiture provisions have provoked great controversy con-
cerning their application to attorneys' fees and have led to conflicting
statutory interpretations. If the relation-back provision applies without
exception to all forfeitable property either in a defendant's possession or
transferred to third parties who do not qualify for bona fide purchaser
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (providing that "[a]ll right, title, and interest
in property.. . vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to
forfeiture under this section").
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(g); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(A); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(B); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B). Preindictment orders expire in
ninety days unless an indictment is filed or an extension is granted. Ia
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(2); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(2). The order is obtained exparte upon a
showing that notice would create a risk of future unavailability. The initial order expires in ten
days unless an extension is granted. Id
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(3); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(3).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n). The petition must be made within thirty days
following the verdict for forfeiture. The hearing is an adversarial hearing that is conducted
without a jury. Id
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1963()(6)(A); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) and ()(6)(B); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) and (n)(6)(B).
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status, it also may apply to attorneys' fees. Those opposed to attorneys'
fee forfeiture may frame their arguments from either a constitutional or a
statutory perspective.
From a constitutional standpoint, a statute applicable to attorneys'
fees implicates fifth and sixth amendment concerns. Those commenta-
tors who argue that such a statute is uncofistitutional claim that fee for-
feiture deprives defendants of their right to counsel of choice. In
addition, the statute affects due process rights because defendants are
prevented from using potentially forfeitable property before the question
of their guilt has been adjudicated. 7
Alternatively, other commentators avoid the constitutional issues by
adopting a statutory construction that does not find legitimate attorneys'
fees forfeitable. In other words, they find the language of the statute to
be sufficiently ambiguous so as to allow an interpretation that carves out
a forfeiture exemption for attorneys' fees.78
On the other hand, the statute may be read as unambiguous in its
intent to reach all tainted assets. Those commentators that accept this
interpretation make no objection to the inclusion of attorneys' fees in
forfeitable assets.79 This reading of the statute looks to the legislative
pledge to combat modem crime on an economic level. As one commen-
tator asserts: "In passing the 1984 Act, Congress committed itself to
making RICO and CCE work, if necessary, over the objections of the
federal judiciary, over the objections of the practicing bar and of criminal
defense lawyers.,'' 0 Each viewpoint has had its representation in the
courts."'
H. Case Law
A. Early Trend in District Courts: Statutory Construction to Avoid
Reaching Constitutional Issues
With one notable exception, 2 the majority of district courts that
77. See supra note 9.
78. See supra note 5.
79. See supra note 6.
80. Blakey, supra note 35, at 789.
81. See. infra notes 82-125 and accompanying text.
82. Payden v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 767
F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985). The Payden court did not follow the early trend in the district courts.
Although the issue was not directly before the court, Payden held that attorneys' fees are
forfeitable. Overriding constitutional objections, the court found that the statute does not in-
terfere with the sixth amendment right to counsel due to the availability of appointed counsel.
Because forfeitable property vests in the government as of the time of the crime's commission,
the court reasoned that such property is not under the defendant's ownership and control and,
as a result, cannot be used to retain an attorney. The court stated: "In the same manner that a
defendant cannot obtain a Rolls-Royce with the fruits of a crime, he cannot be permitted to
obtain the services of the Rolls-Royce of attorneys from these same tainted funds." The court
first addressed the issue of attorneys' fee forfeiture under the new forfei-
ture provisions adopted a statutory construction exempting legitimate
fees from forfeiture.13 In reaching this result, the courts have taken dif-
ferent approaches. Some courts tried to characterize attorneys as bona
fide purchasers.84 Others offered sometimes obscure legislative history to
support the determination that Congress intended to exempt legitimate
attorneys' fees,85 and only sham fees or-fraudulently obtained fees are
forfeitable.
8 6
emphasized that forfeiture of attorneys' fees is compatible with congressional intent to strike at
the economic power supporting crime. Id at 850 n.14.
83. See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985); United States v.
Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1986); United States v.
Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va. 1986); United States v. Estevez, 645 F. Supp. 869
(E.D. Wis. 1986). •
84. See, eg., United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, (D. Colo. 1985). In Rogers, the
court tried to fit attorneys' fees within the bona fide purchaser exemption and found that any
attempt to characterize attorneys as bona fide third-party transferees would probably fail.
Although an attorney gives value for the assets he or she receives, a defendant's attorney could
never take without notice because the assets subject to forfeiture are listed in the indictment.
Id at 1346-47. Because the provisions are silent concerning the forfeitability of attorneys' fees,
the court turned to legislative history to determine the intent of Congress. The Senate Report,
referring to the creation of the bona fide purchaser exemption, stated: "An order may reach
only property of the defendant, save in those instances where a transfer to a third party is
voidable." S. REP. 225, supra note 36, at 201. The court interpreted this statement as intent on
the part of Congress to limit forfeiture of third-party assets to situations where the arm's-
length nature of the transaction is in question. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1347. Thus, the court
held that attorneys should be paid for "services actually and legitimately rendered." Itd at
1348.
85. See, eg., United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). This court
also looked to the legislative history behind the forfeiture provisions and, like Rogers, the
Badalamenti court found little to aid interpretation. The court found a reflection of congres-
sional intent to avoid constitutional infringements in a sentence in a House Judiciary Commit-
tee Report. Id at 197. This statement declared: "Nothing in this section is intended to
interfere with a person's sixth amendment right to counsel." H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 1, at 19 n.1 (1984) [hereinafter H.R. REP. 845]. Because, in dictum, the court
questioned the constitutionality of a statute that reaches attorneys' fees, the court concluded
that Congress did not intend the forfeiture provisions to include legitimate fees. Id at 198. But
cf Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 849 n.14. The Payden court used the same Committee.Report to
support the contrary interpretation that Congress intended to avoid the question entirely, leav-
ing the issue for the courts to resolve. Id at 850 n.14. The statement to which the Payden
court refers declared: "The Committee ... does not resolve the conflict in District Court
opinions on the use of restraining orders that impinge on a person's right to retain counsel in a
criminal case." H.R. REP. 845, supra, at 19 n.1. The Badalamenti court dismissed Payden and
interpreted the second sentence as questioning specifically the constitutionality of restraining
orders. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 197.
86. See, eg., United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The lanniello
court held that because status as a bona fide purchaser would require an attorney to disclose
privileged information, Congress could not have intended for the forfeiture provisions to apply
to legitimate attorneys' fees. Thus, the court reasoned, only sham or fraudulent transactions
between the attorney and the defendant are subject to forfeiture. Id at 458. The court deter-
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All the decisions, however, shared a common theme. Each court
analyzed the statutory languag.- of the forfeiture provisions and found it
ambiguous.8 7 This released the courts from the necessity of considering
the constitutional implications of a statute that includes the forfeiture of
legitimate attorneys' fees. Rather, the courts may look to legislative his-
tory to resolve ambiguities in the statutory language and to seek support
for judicial interpretation of congressional intent.88
This trend came to a halt in United States v. Nichols. 9 Nichols re-
jected a method of analysis that used legislative history to clarify ambigu-
ities in statutory language. On the contrary, the Nichols court found the
statutory language clear and unambiguous. Without resorting to legisla-
tive history, the court held that the forfeiture provisions encompass at-
torneys' fees.90 Accordingly, because the language of the statute clearly
indicates that attorneys' fees are forfeitable property, the court concluded
that the issue to decide is whether a statute with such provisions passes
constitutional muster.91
B. Post-Nichols Constitutional Issues: A Split Among the Circuits
Nichols marked a change in the focus of the courts regarding the
question of fee forfeiture. After Nichols, an increasing number of circuit
courts read the provisions as subjecting attorneys' fees to forfeiture.
This, in turn, led the courts to a constitutional analysis of fifth and sixth
amendment issues. Unlike the identifiable trend in the district courts, no
one viewpoint held sway in the circuit courts. Instead, the circuits split
in their decisions on the constitutionality of the statute.92
Some courts found that the failure of the statute to provide an ex-
mined congressional intent by examining a Senate Committee Report regarding the provision
for bona fide purchasers. The Report stated that the provision "should be construed to deny
relief to third parties acting as nominees of the defendant or who have knowingly engaged in
sham or fraudulent transactions." S. REP. 225, supra note 36, at 3392.
87. See, e.g., Estevez, 645 F. Supp. at 872 (reading the provisions to exempt legitimate fees
conforms with the "spirit" of the statute); Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1339 (statute silent on the
issue of fees and so must turn to legislative history); lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 455 (no express
mention of attorneys' fees).
88. See United States v. Bassett, 632 F.Supp. 1308, 1315-16 (D. Md. 1986) (Congress, in
its aim to prevent the dissipation of assets prior to conviction, could not have meant to include
legitimate attorneys' fees); United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1196-97 (E.D. Va.
1986) (no intent to include legitimate fees because forfeiture would disrupt judicial efficiency).
89. 654 F. Supp. 1541 (C.D. Utah 1987), rev'd, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988).
90. IA at 1555 ("if anything, the reverse is true: the statute is clear on its face; the legisla-
tive history is ambiguous").
91. Id at 1556 ("the only issue Congress left to the courts was whether or not the provi-
sion, as written to encompass attorneys' fees, is constitutional"). A constitutional analysis
found that the statute, as interpreted by the court, impermissibly interfered with a defendant's
sixth amendment right to counsel. Id at 1556-57.
92. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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emption for attorneys' fees created no constitutional problems.93 These
courts focused on the qualified nature of the sixth amendment right to
counsel. In general, the courts following this reasoning found no in-
fringement of a defendant's sixth amendment rights as long as the court
provided appointed counsel as a substitute.
Other courts found that forfeiture as applied to attorneys' fees is
unconstitutional. 94 These courts gave greater weight to a defendant's
sixth amendment right to counsel of choice when balanced against the
government's interest in forfeiture. Most did not find appointed counsel
a comparable substitute.
C. Decisions in the Fourth and Second Circuits: Setting the Stage for
Review by the United States Supreme Court
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cap-
lin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States95 and United States v. Mon-
santo,96 two cases arising in different circuits. The cases supported
opposing arguments and arrived at different conclusions concerning the
constitutionality of the CFA. Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto have a
long history of review and provide an excellent overview of the various
arguments on both sides of the issue.
L Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States
The backdrop for the Fourth Circuit's Caplin & Drysdale decision
was set by United States v. Harvey.97 The court addressed both statutory
93. See eg., United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988). Nichols reversed a
district court decision that declared the statute violated the Sixth Amendment because it did
not provide for the exemption of legitimate attorneys' fees. Id. at 1509. The court found that a
plain reading of the statute includes attorneys' fees. Ma at 1494. The court also found that the
statute does not present an arbitrary interference with a defendant's sixth amendment right to
counsel as long as appointed counsel is made available. Id. at 1505; see also United States v.
Friedman, 849 F.2d 1488, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (no denial of sixth amendment right to coun-
sel since defendant may obtain representation by appointment); United States v. Moya-Gomez,
860 F.2d 706, 731 (7th Cir. 1988) (no violation of Fifth and Sixth Amendments as long as
pretrial hearing establishes the probability that the assets are forfeitable); United States v.
Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1317 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 106 S. Ct. 406 (1985) (sixth amendment
right to counsel of choice is not violated); United States v. Weisman, 858 F.2d 389, 391 (8th
Cir. 1988) (no infringement upon sixth amendment right to counsel of choice); see infra notes
109-117 and accompanying text.
94. See United States v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1332, 1333 (5th Cir.), rehg granted, 844 F.2d 215
(5th Cir. 1988) (statute that requires forfeiture of assets needed to pay reasonable and legiti-
mate fees violates Sixth Amendment); United States v. Unit No. 7 & Unit No. 8, 853 F.2d
1445, 1452 (8th Cir. 1988) (a restraining order that interferes with the payment of legitimate
attorneys' fees violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments); see also infra notes 118-124 and
accompanying text.
95. 488 U.S. 940 (1988).
96. 488 U.S. 941 (1988).
97. 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987).
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and constitutional issues in Harvey. A three-judge panel faced a consoli-
dated appeal of three district court decisions: United States v.
Reckmeyer,98 United States v. Bassett,99 and United States v. Harvey."°°
After a statutory analysis, the appellate court held that the CFA does not
exempt attorneys' fees from forfeiture. 10 1 The court also stated that the
peculiar position a defense attorney occupies in relation to his or her
client makes it highly unlikely that the attorney could ever fulfill the
requirements necessary for standing under the bona fide purchaser ex-
emption. An attorney would rarely be able to claim that tainted assets
were received without notice of their potential forfeitability because the
attorney would be alerted to the nature of his or her client's criminal
difficulties. 10 2 Finally, the court did not find legislative history helpful in
understanding the language of the statute. 103
Once the Harvey court concluded that the forfeiture provisions en-
compassed attorneys' fees, it turned to a constitutional analysis of the
provisions. The court stated that the CFA provisions mandating forfei-
ture of legitimate attorneys' fees infringed upon a defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel of choice.I°0 The court balanced the govern-
ment's interest in forfeiture against a defendant's interest in obtaining
counsel of choice and found that sixth amendment rights carry more
weight. Thus, the court held the CFA provisions unconstitutional to the
extent that they prevent the payment of legitimate attorneys' fees. 0 5
In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & DOrysdale,106 an en banc re-
hearing by the Fourth Circuit, reversed Harvey and held that even legiti-
-98. 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va. 1986). In Reckmeyer, the court held that the statute
provided an exemption for bona fide attorneys' fies. Id at 1195. The court found that a statu-
tory interpretation that permits the forfeiture of legitimate fees violates a defendant's sixth
amendment rights. Id, at 1196.
99. 632 F. Supp. 1308(CD. Md. 1986). In Bassett, the court held that forfeiture of attor-
neys' fees under the statute extended only to sham or fraudulent transactions. Id at 1315-16.
To avoid sixth amendment violati6ns, the court found that Congress did not intend to place
legitimate fees within the reach of the statute. Id at 1317.
100. The district court opinion'for this case is unpublished. All citations appear in the
appellate opinion. In Harvey, the district court denied a motion to exempt assets from forfei-
ture in order to retain private counsel. The defendant was represented by appointed counsel.
United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d, 905, 912 (4th Cir. 1987).
101. Id. at 913-18. This view of the -statute contradicts the Reckmeyer and Bassett hold-
ings. See supra notes 98-99.
102. Id at 915. To avoid addressing the constitutional issues raised by a statutory con-
struction that permitted attorneys' fees forfeiture, earlier district court decisions often tried to
fit attorneys' fees within the bona fide purchaser exemption. See supra note 84.
103. Id at 918. The Senate Committee Report statement upon which many district court
opinions rely t o support their interpretation of congressional intent to exempt attorneys' fees
was dismissed as a "reassuring political gesture." Id; see supra note 85.
104. Id at 923-27. This reverses the district court decision in Harvey. See supra note 100.
105. Id at 927.
106. 837,F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989). The 5-4 decision
includes two judges writing concurring opinions. Id '
CONSTITUTIONALITY WITHOUT WISDOM
mate attorneys' fees are subject to forfeiture under- the statute.1 7 The
rehearing was based entirely upon the defense counsel's third-party claim
for unpaid fees in Reckmeyer.10 The district court allowed the claim
against the forfeitable assets, and the appellate court affirmed. The en
bane rehearing reversed, however. The Caplin & Drysdale court did not
find the CFA unconstitutional" although it agreed with the panel that
the statutory language encompassed attorneys' fees.' 10 The court rea-
soned that the right to counsel is a qualified one and may be limited by a
defendant's resources. The court did not find this right at issue because
forfeited assets do not belong to the defendant and are not available to
retain private counsel." 1
2. United States v. Monsanto
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals faced the same issues in
United States v. Monsanto."2 In Monsanto, a three-judge panel held that
the plain meaning of the statute does not exempt legitimate attorneys'
107. Id. at 642.
108. The Government did not seek rehearing of Basset and Harvey. The Government chose
to pursue only Reckmeyer. United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va. 1986),
aff'd sub nom., United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'dsub nom, United
States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2646
(1989). The history of this case is complex. Reckmeyer was indicted on drug charges under
the CCE statute. Despite a district court order restraining the assets listed in the indictment as
subject to forfeiture, the defendant transferred $26,444.97 to the third-party law firm to obtain
their legal services. In addition, the defendant fied a motion to modify the restraining order to
permit the use of the restrained assets to pay his attorneys' fees. The court denied the motion
because the defendant entered into a plea-agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to the
CCE charge and forfeit all restrained assets. Defense counsel acted to recover $170,512.99 in
fees and retain the $26,444.97 previously received for services rendered. Id at 1193. The dis-
trict court allowed the claim for a share of the forfeited assets, holding that Congress did not
intend for the statute to reach legitimate attorneys' fees. Id at 1195. The appellate decision
based its affirmance of the holding in, Reckmeyer upon a different rationale, however. The
Harvey court found that although the statutory language must be interpreted as making no
exemption for attorneys' fees, the failure to do so is unconstitutional and the statute could not
be enforced against legitimate fees. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 926 (4th Cir. 1987).
109. Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 648.
110. Even the four dissenters agreed that the provisions do not make an exception for
attorneys' fees. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637, 651 (4th Cir.
1988) (Phillips, J., dissenting). They believed that the provisions violated the defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel of choice. Id
111. IdM at644.
112. 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987), vacated, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc) (per
curiam), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989). The defendant was charged under RICO, CCE, and a
firearm statute. An exparte restraining order was issued by the district court pursuant to the
indictment that prohibited the transfer of two parcels of real property, the bulk of the defend-
ants assets. The defendant moved to vacate or modify the order so that private counsel could
be obtained. The district court denied the motion, and the defendant was represented by ap-
pointed counsel. The defendant appealed. Id at 76.
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fees from forfeiture.113 Regarding constitutional issues, the court re-
jected the result reached in Harvey. The Monsanto panel found that the
Harvey court placed too much weight on a defendant's interest in using
tainted assets to mount a defense and undervalued the government's in-
terest in forfeiture as a weapon against crime. 14
The court, however, was reluctant to establish an absolute rule al-
lowing forfeiture of attorneys' fees. As a solution, the panel held that an
adversarial hearing must take place after the issuance of a restraining
order relating to forfeiture in order to satisfy the due process require-
ments of notice and hearing. 5 The court found that the government
must meet its burden of proof in the hearing, to establish the likelihood
that the property is subject to forfeiture. Once the government meets its
burden, there is no sixth amendment right to require that the defendant
be permitted to use the property to retain private counsel. " 6 Should the
government fail to meet its burden, the defendant may use the assets in
question to retain counsel of his or her choice. Assets used for this pur-
pose would remain outside the reach of the statute should the govern-
ment later succeed in proving its case at trial.1 7
At an en banc rehearing, 1" the circuit court vacated the panel deci-
sion.' 19 The court held, in a per curiam opinion, that the defendant is
entitled to use restrained assets to pay the legitimate costs of private
counsel. 20 Unfortunately, no single rationale explained this decision,
prompting one commentator to note that this was a "result without a
reason."'' Although concurring in the result, some judges objected to
113. Id at 80. Two judges joined in the majority opinion. One judge dissented. Id at 74.
114. Id at 80-81.
115. Id at 82-83.
116. Id at 83-84.
117. Id at 84.
118. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988) (en bane) (per curiam).
119. Id at 1402. The timing of the decisions is complicated. Following the panel order,
the district court held a forfeiture hearing that spanned four days. The Government met its
burden of proof at this hearing, and the restraining order remained intact. The defendant
could not use the assets to engage private counsel. The Second Circuit agreed to rehear the
appeal en bane. Id After being granted a rehearing, but before a decision was rendered, the
case went to trial in the district court. Because the defendant's assets remained frozen pending
rehearing, the defendant was represented by appointed counsel at trial. During the trial, the en
bane decision was handed down. In an 8-4 decision, the court ordered the modification of the
restraining order to permit the use of the forfeitable assets for legitimate attorneys' fees. The
district court then offered the defendant use of the assets to retain private counsel. Id The
defendant rejected this offer because of its timing, more than four months into the trial and just
prior to closing arguments, and continued with appointed counsel. Three weeks later the de-
fendant was convicted and his assets forfeited in a special verdict. United States v. Monsanto,
109 S. Ct. 2657, 2661 n.4 (1989).
120. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1402.
121. Brickey, Tainted Assets and the Right to Counsel-The Money Laundering Conun-
drum, 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 47, 59 (1988).
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the forfeiture of attorneys' fees on sixth amendment grounds.122 Others
found it unnecessary to address constitutional issues because they be-
lieved that the language of the statute exempts legitimate fees.123 Two
judges stated that the statute infringes upon due process rights because of
its failure to provide for the type of hearing the panel ordered.'24 Fi-
nally, the dissenters would have upheld the restraining order and for-
feited the assets without providing for attorneys' fees.
125
M . The Supreme Court and Attorneys' Fee Forfeiture:
Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto
The United States Supreme Court divided its consideration of the
issue of attorneys' fee forfeiture under the provisions of the Comprehen-
sive Forfeiture Act (CFA) into two parts, statutory interpretation and
constitutional analysis. The merits of the Caplin & Drysdale12 6 and
Monsanto 127 appeals are weighed in separate, companion opinions writ-
ten by Justice White. The majority contemplated statutory construction
in the Monsanto opinion. Constitutional arguments received only limited
attention. The Caplin & Drysdale opinion, on the other hand, contains
the main thrust of the constitutional analysis. In a separate opinion, the
dissent addressed statutory and constitutional issues as they apply to
both Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto.1
2
1
In these cases, the issue concerning the petitioner's standing in Cap-
lin & Drysdale and the respondent's standing in Monsanto to bring their
cases before the Court was resolved in their favor. In Caplin & Drysdale,
the Government argued that the petitioner 2 9 did not have the required
jus tertil standing to advance the constitutional rights of Reckmeyer.13 0
While conceding that the Government's argument had some merit, the
122. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1402, 1404, 1418 (Feinberg, Oakes, JJ., concurring and Pierce,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Feinberg was joined by Judge Oakes and
Judge Pierce. Judge Oakes fied a separate concurring opinion. Judge Pierce was joined by
Judge Cardamone.
123. I at 1405 (Winter, J., concurring). Judge Winter was joined by Judge Meskill and
Judge Newman.
124. Id. at 1411 (Miner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Miner was
joined by Judge Altimari. See also supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
125. Id. at 1412 (Mahoney, J., dissenting). Judge Mahoney was joined by Judge
Cardamone and Judge Pierce except as to section D of the dissenting opinion.
126. 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
127. 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
128. 109 S. Ct. 2667 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
129. The petitioner is a law firm that represented Reckmeyer during the grand jury investi-
gation prior to his indictment. The firm continued to represent Reckmeyer after his indict-
ment and in the proceedings that followed. The firm sought to recover approximately
S170,000'in legal fees incurred during this period as well as to retain the $26,444.97 previously
paid by Reckmeyer. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2649-50.
130. Id at 2651 n.3.
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Court acknowledged that the petitioner had the necessary standing to
pursue litigation. 1 1 In Monsanto, the Court decided that although Mon-
santo had been brought to trial and a special verdict judged his assets
forfeitable, the issue concerning the pretrial restraining order remained
alive because Monsanto had not yet exhausted the appellate process.' 32
A. Majority Opinions
L Rejection of a Statutory Interpretation Exempting Attorneys' Fees From
Forfeiture
In Monsanto, the Court looked first to the language of the statute to
determine whether the forfeiture provisions include attorneys' fees. The
Court found the statutory language "plain and unambiguous" in its fail-
ure to provide an exemption for attorneys' fees.'33 For support, the
Court drew upon the strong language used in the statute. Cast in terms
of the compulsory "shall order forfeiture" and the expansive reach of
"all property,"'3 4 the Court maintained that "Congress could not have
chosen stronger words to express its intent that forfeiture be mandatory
in cases where the statute applied, or broader words to define the scope of
what was to be forfeited."' 35
The Court dismissed respondent's argument that the definition of
property does not include attorneys' fees.'36 The Court found no lan-
guage in the statute to support this reading. On the contrary, the stat-
ute's property definition is "all-inclusive."' 37 Nor was the Court able to
find support for this argument from the circuit courts. Nearly every cir-
131. Id. The Court has two requirements that must be satisfied in order to obtainjus tertii
standing. First, the petitioner must be injured in a manner that satisfies Article M's case-or-
controversy criteria. The Court must determine that the attorneys' fees at issue are sufficient
to meet this condition. Second, the Court considers whether prudential concerns would favor
permitting the petitioner to advance a third party's claim.
The Court weighed three factors in this determination: (1) the relationship of the peti-
tioner to Reckmeyer; (2) Reckmeyer's ability to appear before the Court to advance his own
rights; and (3) the impact that the appeal would have on third party interests. Although there
was nothing to prevent Reckmeyer from advancing his own claim, the Court concluded that
the relationship between Reckmeyer and his attorneys was of "special consequence" and the
statute may have made it difficult for Reckmeyer, as a third party, to advance his own rights.
As a result, the Court found that the law firm had jus tertii standing. IL
132. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2661 n.4.
133. Id at 2662.
134. Section 853 states: "The court, in imposing sentence on such person, shall order, in
addition to any other sentence imposed... that the person forfeit to the United States all
property described in this subsection." 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
135. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2662.
136. Id
137. d Section 853(b) defines property to include "real property" as well as "tangible and




cuit court that considered this argument rejected it.138
Although the statute does not expressly exempt attorneys' fees from
the property subject to forfeiture, the respondent argued that the stat-
ute's failure to address the issue indicates a lack of congressional intent to
place fees within the scope of the provisions. At the very least, the re-
spondent declared, the silence indicates that Congress did not consider
the implications of the provisions as they apply to attorneys' fees.'39
The Court acknowledged that the legislative history is not volumi-
nous regarding congressional intent on the issue of attorneys' fee forfei-
ture. The Court disagreed, however, that the small amount that can be
considered applicable to the issue favored the respondent's interpretation
of the statute. The Court stated that the passage in a House Judiciary
Committee Report most frequently cited in support of an exemption for
attorneys' fees"4 can better be interpreted as an express indication that
legislators intended to leave this determination to the courts rather than
to resolve it themselves. 4' In addition, the Court pointed to another
section of the same report suggesting that part of the motivation behind
the provisions was congressional frustration with the amount of forfeita-
ble property diverted to pay attorneys' fees. 42
The Court placed no value upon the postenactment comments of
legislators regarding the purpose behind the statute, despite Monsanto's
efforts to convince them otherwise. 4 3 The Court found that congres-
sional intent is "'best determined by [looking to] the statutory language
it chooses.""' Furthermore, the Court questioned the respondent's in-
terpretation of the intent behind the provisions because another statute
enacted simultaneously with the CFA contains the "precise" exemption
138. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2662 &'n.7.
139. IM at 2662.
140. Id. at 2662 n.8. Monsanto cited a House Judiciary Committee Report to support his
view that Congress wanted to remain aloof from the issue of attorneys' fee forfeiture: "Nothing
in this section is intended to interfere with a person's sixth amendment right to counsel. The
Committee, therefore, does not resolve the conflict in District Court opinions on the use of
restraining orders that impinge on a person's right to retain counsel in a criminal case." Id.
(quoting H.1L REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 19 n.1 (1984)).
141. Id The Court read this "ambiguous passage" as a sign that Congress withheld its
disapproval of pretrial restraining orders. According to the Court, Congress was simply warn-
ing the courts to act prudently in this area. Id
142. Id at 2662 n.8. The Court cited a House Judiciary Committee Report that discussed
the result of a major drug prosecution: "Of the $750,000 for the residences, $175,000 was
returned to the wife of one of the defendants, and $559,000 was used to pay the defendant's
attorneys .... The Government wound up with $16,000 .... It is against this background
that present Federal forfeiture procedures are tested and found wanting." Id. (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 3 (1984)).
143. Id at 2663. The Court was referring to comments made by Senator Leahy and Repre-
sentatives Hughes and Shaw indicating that they never envisioned that the forfeiture provi-
sions would encompass attorneys' fees. Id
144. Id (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 n.13 (1985)).
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the respondent was attempting to impose here. 45 As further evidence of
congressional intent, the Court pointed to the failure of Congress to
amend the forfeiture provisions despite subsequent opportunities and re-
peated urging to do so.
146
Moreover, the Court declared that any silence on the part of Con-
gress should not be used to create ambiguity. Legislative history does
not mention the express intention of Congress to encompass "stockbro-
ker's fees, laundry bills, or country club memberships," but it does not
make sense to argue that these items were meant to be excluded from
forfeiture.147 The Court expressed that Congress should not be required
to add, "and we even mean assets to be used to pay an attorney," before
the statute may be construed to reach attorneys' fees.
148
Both the respondent in Monsanto and the petitioner in Caplin &
Drysdale adopted an argument based on the concurring opinion of Judge
Winter in the en banc decision of United States v. Monsanto. 4 9 Judge
Winter urged. that the permissive language50 the statute uses to describe
the issuance of pretrial restraining orders gives district courts the discre-
tion to decide the manner in which to implement such orders.'' The
decision to issue a restraining order should be based upon "traditional
equitable principles that balance the relative hardships to the parties."' 52
Judge Winter asserted that, in most cases, the defendant should be per-
mitted to use potentially forfeitable assets for "ordinary lawful expendi-
tures, including expenditures to retain private legal counsel."'5 3 Further,
once a district court exercises its discretion to permit the release of re-
strained assets to retain counsel, these assets should be immunized from
145. Id. at 2664. The Victims of Crime Act of 1984 requires the forfeiture of collateral
profits derived from crime. In other words, criminals may not keep the profits of any books
written or movies made about their lives. The forfeiture provision expressly exempts attor-
neys' fees that do not exceed twenty percent of the forfeited collateral profits. Id (citing 18
U.S.C. § 3681(c)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. 1982)).
146. Id at 2663.
147. Id
148. Id
149. Id at 2664-65; Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2650-
51 (1989).
150. Section 853(e)(1) states: "Upon application of the United States, the court may enter
a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or
take any other action to preserve the availability of property ... ." 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)
(Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
151. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1405 (1988) (Winter, J., concurring).
Judge Winter stated: "I am frankly puzzled why a statutory provision with such permissive
language has been read by so many courts to authorize as a routine matter, much less require,
the most draconian of restraints on a defendant's assets without giving any consideration to the
hardship such a restraint imposes." Id
152. Id
153. Id at 1406.
later forfeiture should the government prevail at trial.
1 54
The Court rejected this argument as a misreading of the provision.
The Court stated that the district courts simply do not have as much
discretion as this interpretation would indicate.15 5 Any discretion af-
forded the district courts "must be cabined by the purposes for which
Congress created it."'5 6 Because the goal of this statute is to "'preserve
the availability of property ... for forfeiture,' " the Court declared
that the permissive language pertains only to the issuance of a restraining
order, not to forfeiture itself. A restraining order is only one tool district
courts may use to implement the statute. A court also may permit a
defendant to post bond for the value of the forfeitable assets instead of
freezing the specific assets. Should the defendant be unable to post bond,
however, the court must issue a restraining order to prevent the pretrial
dissipation of assets. Thus, while the manner of implementation is at the
court's discretion, whether to impose forfeiture is not.'
58
Finally, the Court refused to accept the respondent's argument that
doctrines of statutory construction demand that the statute be inter-
preted to avoid the issue of its constitutionality.5 9 The Court stated that
these doctrines should be followed only in cases in which the statute is
ambiguous. Because the Court found the language in this case clearly
unambiguous, the Court found no need to utilize the canons of statutory
construction to construe the statute.160 The doctrines are not, the Court
declared, "'a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the
legislature.' ",161 In the words of Justice White, "This result may seem
harsh, but we have little doubt that it is the one that the statute
mandates." 1
62
2. Rejection of Constitutional Arguments Against Attorneys' Fee Forfeiture
In Caplin & Drysdale, the petitioner advanced two constitutional
arguments. First, the petitioner argued that a statutory interpretation of
the forfeiture provisions that does not provide an exemption for attor-
neys' fees violates a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel of
choice.1 63 Second, the petitioner contended that the statute places too
much power in the hands of the prosecution, thereby creating an imbal-
ance that impermissibly interferes with a defendant's due process rights
154. Id at 1410.
155. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2651 (1989).
156. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2665 (1989).
157. Id (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1) (Supp. V 1982)).
158. Id
159. Id at 2664.
160. Id
161. Id (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985)).
162. Id at 2665.
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under the Fifth Amendment."' The Court ultimately rejected both con-
stitutional challenges to the statute.
165
a. The Sixth Amendment Argument
The petitioner contended, in its sixth amendment argument, that
there will be times when defendants are prevented from obtaining their
counsel of choice.1 66 This will occur because a defendant no longer has
the freedom to use his or her assets to engage an attorney, or because the
preferred attorney will not accept the defendant as a client out of fear
that his or her fees may be subject to later forfeiture. The petitioner
urged that it is in these situations that the Sixth Amendment protects a
defendant. 167
In dismissing the petitioner's sixth amendment argument, the Court
stated that the protection afforded a defendant is one of adequate coun-
sel, not an unlimited choice of counsel.16 A particular defendant's re-
sources and the preferred attorney's willingness to take on the case limit
the right to acquire representation of choice. The Court declared that
"'a defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot
afford.' ,169 Thus, a defendant may hire an attorney within his or her
price range or one who will work without pay. The Government may
not interfere in this selection. Accordingly, the Court found the burden
placed on a defendant by the forfeiture provisions was of a limited nature
only.'1 0 A defendant has the option of using other nonrestrained assets
in his or her possession to obtain preferred counsel. The Court main-
tained that even defendants rendered constructively indigent by the stat-
ute "may be able to find lawyers willing to represent them, hoping that
their fees will be paid in the event of acquittal, or via some other means
that a defendant might come by in the future."
171
Further, the Court asserted that if defendants do not have sufficient
nonforfeitable resources to retain private counsel, they "have no cogniza-
ble complaint so long as they are adequately represented by attorneys
appointed by the courts."' 72 Because forfeitable assets belong to the gov-
ernment as of the time of the commission of the crime for which a de-
164. Id. at 2656.
165. Id at 2657.
166. Id at 2652.
167. Id
168. Id





fendant is charged,17 the Court declared that a defendant has no claim
to such assets. No sixth amendment violation occurs unless a defendant
is prevented from using his or her own property to obtain counsel. The
Court declared that "[a] defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to
spend another person's money for services rendered by an attorney, even
if those funds are the only way that that defendant will be able to retain
the attorney of his choice."174
The petitioner also argued that the interest in protecting a defend-
ant's sixth amendment rights outweighs the government's interest in for-
feiture.175 The petitioner claimed that, unlike the proceeds of other
crimes, a defendant retains good title to restrained assets until a special
verdict forfeits the property to the United States. For example, robbery
proceeds never belong to a defendant because title does not pass simply
as a result of unlawful possession.176 Therefore, the petitioner con-
tended, the legal fiction employed by the forfeiture provisions to deprive
defendants of their choice of counsel is not strong enough to sanction the
resulting impairment of interests protected by the Sixth Amendment. 177
In addition, the petitioner asserted that the congressional purpose
behind the statute is to remove the economic incentive from specific types
of crime. The petitioner argued that using forfeitable assets to retain
counsel accomplishes this goal. 178 Forcing defendants to use these pro-
ceeds to retain defense counsel effectively separates defendants from the
proceeds of their crimes. Defendants then are prevented from using ille-
gal profits in the furtherance of other crimes. Thus, the petitioner con-
tended, the government's interest in forfeiture of attorneys' fees is
substantially diminished because the objective of the statute can be
achieved without depriving defendants of their right to counsel of
choice. 
179
The Court rejected these arguments. The Court asserted that the
Government's property interest was "more substantial than petitioner ac-
knowledges." 180 The Court looked to a similar forfeiture provision in the
Internal Revenue Code to establish that the United States has a long
history of forfeiting title to assets as of the time of violation. The Court
maintained that "[c]oncluding that [a defendant] cannot give good title
to such property ... because he did not hold good title is neither ex-
173. Section 853(c) states that "[a]U right, title and interest in property ... vests in the
United States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture." 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp.
IV 1986).
174. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2652.
175. Id at 2653.
176. Id at 2652-53.
177. Id at 2653.
178. Id at 2654.
179. Id
180. Id at 2653.
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traordinary or novel." '
Moreover, the Court stated that the government has a strong pecu-
niary interest in divesting criminals of their criminal proceeds. Allowing
defendants to deplete forfeitable assets prior to conviction does not serve
this interest.18 2 The government has an interest in recovering "all forfeit-
able assets" because they can be used to fund "law-enforcement efforts in
a variety of important and useful ways." ' In addition, the government
has an interest in preserving forfeitable property intact because the prop-
erty must be returned to any bona fide owners who claim it.18M The
Court declared that "[w]here the Government pursues this restitutionary
end, the government's interest in forfeiture is virtually indistinguishable
from its interest in returning to a bank the proceeds of a bank rob-
bery." 185 Finally, the Court declared that destroying the economic
power of crime figures "includes the use of such economic power to re-
tain private counsel."1 86 While recognizing that this concept may be
"somewhat unsettling,"' 187 the Court asserted that this reflects "'the
harsh reality that the quality of a criminal defendant's representation fre-
quently may turn on his ability to retain the best counsel money can
buy.' ",188 The Court did not feel that a drug dealer deserves a better
defense than a petty thief because he or she has access to larger sums of
money. 
8 9
Following this reasoning, the Court rejected the argument that ap-
pointed counsel is inadequate to deal with the complexities of a RICO or
CCE defense. 190 The Court stated that "[i]f such an argument were ac-
cepted, it would bar the trial of indigents charged with such offenses,
because those persons would have to rely on appointed counsel ... ". .
1 91
If counsel is ineffective in an individual case, this can be dealt with as it
occurs. The Court dismissed any notion that "the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is a guarantee of a privately-
retained counsel in every complex case, irrespective of a defendant's abil-
ity to pay.'
1 92
The Court also rejected the arguments the petitioner advanced re-
garding possible ethical conflicts. First, the Court declared that any dis-
181. Id
182. Id at 2654.
183. Id (emphasis in original).
184. Id
185. Id
186. Id at 2654-55.
187. Id at 2655.
188. Id (quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
result)).
189. Id




incentive created by the statute to fully investigate the source of a client's
funds would be slight.193 The provision requires that third parties
demonstrate they were "'reasonably without cause to believe that the
property was subject to forfeiture'" at the time the property was trans-
ferred to them. 194 Because "the only way a lawyer could be a beneficiary
of [the bona fide purchaser provision] would be to fail to read the indict-
ment of his client," the Court found it unlikely that attorneys will at-
tempt to qualify.195
Second, the Court dismissed the argument that the possibility that
an attorney may encourage a defendant to accept a less desirable plea
bargain renders the statute unconstitutional. The Court declared that if
an attorney recommends an agreement because it contains a prison term
rather than forfeiture, the case could be resolved on the basis of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. Such cases can be addressed on an individual
basis as they arise. 196 Finally, the Court did not believe that the statute
creates a system of contingency fees for criminal cases. The Court did
state, however, that even if the statute were interpreted in this manner,
"[t]he fact that a federal statutory scheme authorizing contingency fees
... is at odds with model disciplinary rules or state disciplinary codes
hardly renders the federal statute invalid."
197
b. The Fifth Amendment Arguments
The Court then turned to the petitioner's second constitutional ar-
gument, that the statute violates due process under the Fifth Amendment
because it disturbs the balance of power between the government and the
defendant. Although the Due Process Clause protects the right to a fair
trial, the Court stated that the Sixth Amendment defines the principles of
a fair trial.198 Because the Court had already determined that the Sixth
Amendment does not render the statute invalid, the Court concluded
that the Fifth Amendment due process claim added nothing.199 Nor did
the Court find that the mere possibility of prosecutorial abuse violating
due process rendered the statute unconstitutional. 2" The Court declared
that "[tihe Constitution does not forbid the imposition of an otherwise
permissible criminal sanction, such as forfeiture, merely because in some
cases prosecutors may abuse the processes available to them.... "201 The
Court instead suggested that the lower courts deal with the abuses indi-
193. Id. at 2656 n.10.




198. Id at 2656.
199. Id
200. Id at 2657.
201. Id
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vidually "when (and if) any such cases arise."202
In addition to the issues raised in Caplin & Drysdale, the Court in
Monsanto considered a final fifth amendment argument. In Monsanto,
the respondent contended that a preconviction restriction of assets in-
fringed upon his constitutional right to due process.20 3 The Court did
not accept this argument and declared that assets may be restrained
before conviction "based on a finding of probable cause to believe that
the assets are forfeitable." 2" Because it is possible to restrain persons
based on such a showing, the Court stated that "it would be odd to con-
clude that the Government may not restrain property."2 5 The Court,
however, did not establish a procedure for determining whether probable
cause exists to issue protective orders. The Court expressly left open the
question whether a hearing is required before the issuance of a pretrial
restraining order. 6
B. Dissenting Opinion
The dissenters20 7 began by stating that they have been guided by
"one core insight: that it is unseemly and unjust for the Government to
beggar those it prosecutes in order to disable their defense at trial."20 8
This statement set the tone for the dissent. Justice Blackmun continued
by declaring that the majority "trivializes" the burden on the defendant
and advised the Court to follow the lead of the district courts because
they encounter RICO and CCE cases more frequently.2" Blackmun be-
lieved that the statutes could have and should have been interpreted as
exempting legitimate attorneys' fees from forfeiture. Even if Congress
wrote these statutes intending the forfeiture of attorneys' fees, Blackmun
argued that such statutes could not be enforced because they violate the
Sixth Amendment. 210
L Statutes Should Be Read To Exempt Attorneys' Fees From Forfeiture
The dissenters stated that there was no express provision mandating
202. lId
203. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2666 (1989).
204. Id
205. Id
206. Ia at 2666 n.10. Because the Government established probable cause at a hearing
ordered by the Second Circuit and the district court issued a restraining order, the Court found
it unnecessary to consider the issue. Nor did the Court consider whether the district court's
four-day hearing was adequate in the event that such a hearing was required by the Due Pro-
cess Clause. Id
207. Justice Blackmun wrote the dissenting opinion. He was joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens.




the forfeiture of attorneys' fees. 2 1' Nor was there useful discussion of the
issue in the statutes' legislative history.212 The dissenters stated, how-
ever, that unlike "stockbroker's fees, laundry bills, or country club mem-
berships" described by the majority,213 "one cannot believe that
Congress was unaware that interference with the payment of attorney's
fees... would raise Sixth Amendment concerns."21
Although the dissenters conceded that the statutory language may
be broad and mandatory in a specific section, they argued that the stat-
utes "as a whole" are ambiguous. 215 The dissenters agreed with Judge
Winter that the mandatory language of section 853(a) applies only to
"any person convicted"2 16 under the statute.21 7 Thus, forfeiture of prop-
erty transferred to third parties is controlled by the discretionary provi-
sion of section 853(C). 218 The dissenters declared that this departure
from mandatory language is significant. 219 Therefore, the dissenters con-
tended that the property held by third parties will be forfeited "only if it
is included in the special verdict, and its inclusion in the verdict is discre-
tionary. ' 220 The dissenters found the different treatment accorded for-
feitable property depending on whether it remains in the hands of the
defendant or has been transferred to a third party, consistent with the
distinction between civil and criminal forfeiture.2 2
In addition, the dissenters claimed that "the Government does not
have an absolute right to an order preserving the availability of property
by barring its transfer to third parties. '2 22 On the contrary, the section
of the provision that controls the issuance of preconviction restraining
211. Id at 2668.
212. Id The dissenters felt that the most legislative history has to say on attorneys' fees is
contained in the passage of the House Report cited in Monsanto: "Nothing in this section is
intended to interfere with a person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Id at 2668 n.2
(quoting H.R.REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 19 n.1 (1984)). Even if the dissent-
ers accepted the majority's opinion that the passage is simply a warning to the courts to take
special care with this issue, the dissenters did not understand why the majority "proceed[ed] to
ignore Congress' exhortation to construe the statute to avoid implicating Sixth Amendment
concerns." Id
213. Id. at 2668 (quoting United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2663 (1989)).
214. Id at 2668.
215. Id (emphasis in original).
216. 21 U.S.C. § 852(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
217. 109 S. Ct. at 2668 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Monsanto, 852
F.2d 1400, 1410 (2d Cir. 1988) (Winter, J., concurring), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989)).
218. Id Section 853(c) states: "Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a
person other than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture ... " 21
U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
219. 109 S. Ct. at 2669 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 2668.
221. Id. at 2669 n.5. Because the "purpose of [criminal] forfeiture is to punish the defend-
ant, the Government's penal interests are weakest when the punishment also burdens third
parties." Id.
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orders uses discretionary language.22 3 The dissent also drew support
from a Senate report stating that a district court may hold a hearing
before a protective order is issued to determine its "reasonableness" and
may modify the order at a later time.
224
Although the dissenters agreed with the majority that the discretion
given to the district courts in sections 853(c) and 853(e)(1) must not frus-
trate congressional intent, the dissenters asserted that the majority had
ascribed an overly broad purpose to the statute.225 The dissenters con-
tended that the statute is not a "revenue-raising measure. ' 226 Rather
than aiming to preserve "all" property for government use, legislative
history demonstrates that the statutes' purpose is to destroy the eco-
nomic power bases of criminals left untouched in the past.227 Allowing a
criminal to retain criminal proceeds permitted their use in future illegal
activities.22 The dissenters declared that "Congress' desire to maximize
punishment, however, cannot be viewed as a blanket authorization of
government action that punishes the defendant before he is proved
guilty. ' 229 The dissenters contended that the statutes' primary purpose
can be achieved without depriving defendants of assets with which they
may retain private counsel because "[a]ssets used to retain counsel by
definition will be unavailable to the defendant or his criminal organiza-
tion after trial, even if the defendant is eventually acquitted. ' 230  The
dissenters also asserted that district court supervision will ensure good
223. Id. Section 853(e)(1) states: "Upon application of the United States, the court may
enter a restraining order or injunction .... ." 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
224. 109 S. Ct. at 2669 (citing S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., at 202 (1983), re-
printed in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3385-86).
225. Id
226. Id at 2670 n.6 (citing United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1407 & n.1 (2d Cir.
1988) (Winter,*J., concurring), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989)). Thus, while the Government has
an interest in using the forfeitable property it recovers for law-enforcement efforts, the dissent-
ers did not find this interest to be dispositive. Nor is restitution a dispositive goal because the
types of assets at issue in typical RICO and CCE cases are profits resulting from criminal
activity that no particular individual can claim. Id
227. Id at 2670.
228. Id
229. Id at 2670 n.8. The dissenters objected to the majority's easy dismissal of this issue:
"'The notion that the Government has a legitimate interest in depriving criminals'-before
they are convicted--'of economic power... to retain counsel of choice' is more than just
'somewhat unsettling,'.. . [it] is constitutionally suspect, and... completely foreign to Con-
gress' stated goals." Id at 2670 n.7 (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,
109 S. Ct. 2646, 2655 (1989) (emphasis in original)). Even the "similar" forfeiture provision
cited from the Victims of Crime Act "cuts against the result the majority reaches" because it
applies to postconviction earnings. Id at 2671 n.10 (citing Victims of Crime Act, Pub. L. No.
98-473, 98 Stat. 2175, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3681 (Supp. V 1982)). The dissenters found it
unlikely that "Congress intended to be more punitive when it comes to a defendant's need for
counsel prior to conviction, when the defendant's own liberty is at stake." Id (emphasis in
original).
230. Id at 2671.
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faith transfers and protect the government's interests.23 1
Thus, the dissenters concluded, it is possible to interpret the statutes
to exempt legitimate attorneys' fees from forfeiture. A statutory con-
struction that gives "full effect to the discretionary language in §§ 853(c)
and 853(e)(1)" avoids any constitutional questions.232 Because the ma-
jority did not interpret the statutes in this manner, the dissenters turned
to an examination of the constitutional problems inherent in the major-
ity's statutory reading.
2. A Statute That Does Not Exempt Attorneys' Fees From Forfeiture Is
Unconstitutional
The dissenters criticized the majority's failure to fully appreciate the
extent of the Sixth Amendment's protection of the right to counsel of
choice.233 The dissenters believed this failure is illustrated by the way the
majority "move[d] rapidly from the observation that 'a defendant may
not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford,' to the con-
clusion that the Government is free to deem the defendant indigent by
declaring his assets 'tainted' by criminal activity the Government has yet
to prove. '234  The dissenters argued "[tihat the majority implicitly
find[ing] the sixth amendment right to counsel of choice so insubstantial
that it can be outweighed by a legal fiction demonstrates, still once again,
[that it] has lost track of the distinct role of the right to counsel of choice
in protecting the integrity of the judicial process .... ,235
The dissenters placed great weight on the independence of the de-
fense attorney for a number of reasons.236 First, trust is an essential com-
ponent of the relationship between attorney and client. Trust is
engendered by a defendant's ability to select his or her own counsel.237
Thus, attorneys' fee forfeiture intrudes where it does not belong: "When
the Government insists upon the right to choose the defendant's counsel
for him, that relationship of trust is undermined: counsel is too readily
perceived as the Government's agent rather than his own.
'238
Second, independent choice of counsel puts some equality back into
a system in which the prosecution has access to significantly greater re-
231. Id
232. Id at 2671-72. Indeed, the dissenters stated that "even the broadest statutory lan-
guage may be interpreted as excluding cases that would *raise serious constitutional questions,
absent a clear expression of an affirmative intention of Congress to include those cases." Id at
2671 n.11.
233. Id at 2672.





238. Id at 2673.
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sources. 239 The government can often simply outspend the defendant.
The disparity is even more apparent in RICO and CCE cases because the
government may devote greater resources to those cases because "the
punitive stakes are high."' 21° In these situations, "there are few defend-
ants... who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and
present their defenses" 24 1 On the other hand, in appointed counsel
cases, "there is no guarantee that levels of compensation and stafing will
be even average."242
The dissenters feared that if appointed-counsel rates were the only
compensation to be earned from criminal-defense work, eventually there
would be a decrease in the quality of talent and in the number of attor-
neys entering the criminal-defense bar.243 This would lead to a "virtual
socialization of criminal defense work in this country" resulting in the
standardization of services and decreased independence for those that re-
main in the field. 2" Perhaps more than any other area of law, criminal
defense needs the "the maverick and the risk-taker" to discover new ap-
proaches and to address the increasing complexity of our criminal justice
system.245
The dissenters declared that "[h]ad it been Congress' express aim to
undermine the adversary system as we know it, it could hardly have
found a better engine of destruction than attorney's-fee forfeiture." 2'
The dissenters predicted that even the possibility of forfeiture will "sub-
stantially diminish the likelihood that private counsel will agree to take
the case. ' '24l -Perhaps an attorney would take the case on a contingency
fee basis, but the dissenters questioned "the integrity of any criminal-
defense attorney who would violate the ethical norms of the profession
by doing so .... "24
The dissenters also addressed the issue of potential conflict-of-inter-
est problems. The dissenters feared that when appointed counsel faces "a
lengthy trial against a better-armed adversary, the temptation to recom-
239. Id
240. Id
241. Id (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)).
242. Id For example, compensation under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A, considered to be one of the more generous plans, is quite "low by American stan-
dards." Id at 2673 n. 12 (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 57 n.21 (1972) (Powell,
J., concurring in the result)).
243. Id. at 2673.
244. Id at 2673-74.
245. Id at 2674.
246. Id
247. Id. The dissenters feared that some defendants may find themselves without access to
appointed counsel because they do not qualify as indigent, yet are unable to employ private
counsel due to the risk of subsequent fee forfeiture. Id. at 2674 n.14.
248. Id at 2675.
mend a guilty plea will be great." 249 Even private attorneys may be con-
fronted with conflicts as they try to maintain bona fide third-party status.
"The attorney's interest in knowing nothing is directly adverse to his
client's interest in full disclosure" and may lead to a "failure to recognize
or pursue avenues of inquiry necessary to the defense. '250 Neither situa-
tion, the dissenters argued, takes into account a defendant's best
interests.
Because forfeiture remains a discretionary tool of the government,
the dissent contended that "[t]he Government will be ever tempted to use
the forfeiture weapon against a defense attorney who is particularly tal-
ented or aggressive on the client's behalf-the attorney who is better than
what, in the Government's view, the defendant deserves. ' 25 1 This cre-
ates a situation in which "burdening the exercise of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right was not the unfortunate consequence of the Govern-
ment's action, but its very purpose. ' 25 2 As a result, the government be-
comes the adversary of both the defense attorney and the defendant.
253
Furthermore, the government's interest in forfeiture is too weak to
legitimize its "naked desire" to deprive a defendant of a worthy advo-
cate.254 Property rights based on a legal fiction do not outweigh a de-
fendant's sixth amendment rights especially because they do not vest in
the government until after conviction. Until conviction, "sole title to
such assets ... rests in the defendant; no other party has any present
legal claim to them. ' 25 There is no contest: "The Government's inter-
est in the assets at the time of their restraint is no more than an interest
in safeguarding fictive property rights, one which hardly weighs at all
against the defendant's formidable Sixth Amendment right to retain
counsel for his defense."2 56 In addition, other "legitimate providers of
services" will qualify under the bona fide purchaser exemption: "The
exception is the defendant's attorney, who cannot do his job (or at least
cannot do his job well) without asking questions that will reveal the




252. Id. at 2678 n.16.
253. Id at 2675.
254. Id. at 2676.
255. Id
256. Id at 2677. According to the dissentersi the majority's analogy to a bail situation is
not appropriate here. Before a person is held over without bail for trial, the government must
demonstrate that the defendant's appearance could not be assured by some other means. No
alternative showing is required under the forfeiture provisions. "Furthermore, the potential
danger resulting from the failure to restrain assets differs in kind and severity from the danger
faced by the public when a defendant who is believed to be Violent remains at large before
trial." Id
257. Id at 2678.
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the government has an interest in recovering all forfeitable property
when "the burdens fall almost exclusively upon the exercise of a constitu-
tional right."25
The dissenters concluded by arguing that the majority's construc-
tion of the statute was "inconsistent with the intent of Congress" and
"seriously undermines the basic fairness of our criminal-justice sys-
tem."'25 9 The dissenters called upon Congress to amend the statute to
show that it did not intend the majority's result.2 6"
IV. Weighing the Arguments
A. The Majority's Reasoning for Choosing a Statutory Interpretation
Encompassing Fees Is Unpersuasive
The majority's assertion that both the language of the statute and
legislative history reveal an intent for the forfeiture provisions to encom-
pass legitimate attorneys' fees is unpersuasive.26 1 The majority did not
adequately explain the shift from mandatory language to discretionary
language in selected sections of the statute.262 This shift has more signifi-
cance than the majority suggests.26 More importantly, the majority's
interpretation of the statute does not accurately reflect congressional in-
tent in passing the forfeiture provisions.
Congress did not create an express provision in the statute requiring
the forfeiture of attorneys' fees.2 Nor does the legislative history di-
rectly address the issue.265 Thus, the best way to interpret the statute is
to examine Congress' stated purpose in enacting the forfeiture provisions.
Congress stated that the primary purpose behind the forfeiture provi-
sions is to attack the incentive behind organized crime and drug activi-
ties: huge economic profits.266 The original forfeiture provisions under
RICO and CCE failed in this endeavor because of procedural difficulties
in preventing the preconviction dissipation of assets. With the CFA,
Congress hoped to address this problem and ensure that a defendant
could not escape the economic impact of forfeiture so easily.267 Congress
sought to destroy the economic organization that directed the criminal




261. See supra notes 133-162 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 150-158 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 155-158 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 78-80, 87 and accompanying text
265. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 57.
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earned from illegal activities would continue to support crime.2 68 Con-
gress could consider this goal accomplished if criminals were denied ac-
cess to the profits of their wrong-doing and thus prevented from
contributing to the perpetuation of a criminal enterprise.
Therefore, preventing a defendant from using forfeitable assets to
retain an attorney is not encompassed by the statutes' primary purpose.
Even if the forfeitable assets derive from illegal activities, the intent of the
statute has been fulfilled as long as the defendant is prevented from re-
cycling the proceeds transferred to defense counsel in order to fund fu-
ture criminal enterprises. Other benefits are simply by-products of this
goal. No legitimate government interest is served by recovering all for-
feitable property because the statute is not primarily directed at revenue-
raising.269 Nor is restitution an adequate barrier to an exemption for
attorneys' fees. The nature of the proceeds is such that there is no identi-
fiable victim to step forward and claim them.
Furthermore, by establishing procedures allowing bona fide third
parties a means to claim assets or retain those transferred in good faith,
Congress recognized that some claims are superior to those of the gov-
ernment.270 This is consistent with congressional design. As long as de-
fendants do not have the freedom to dissipate assets in a manner that
contributes to their enjoyment or amounts to sham or fraudulent trans-
fers, the statutes' goal is satisfied. Distinguishing attorneys from other
third parties who provide legitimate services serves no purpose. Criminal
forfeiture, unlike civil forfeiture, has a penal element.271 This punish-
ment, however, is reserved for the convicted defendant-not innocent
third parties. Criminal forfeiture should not, punish defendants before
conviction by crippling their ability to put on a defense of their choice.
The government's only legitimate interest in attorneys' fees is in prevent-
ing the dissipation of assets through sham or fraudulent transfers. This
can be accomplished, as the dissenters suggest, through reasonable court
supervision to ensure good faith transfers.
272
A passage in a House Judiciary Committee report cited by the ma-
jority reflects congressional frustration with the loss of forfeitable assets
to large attorneys' fees.2 3 -This- frustration then is taken as a signal the
forfeiture provisions meant to include those large fees.274 A number of
factors, however, must be considered. Legislators may have been dis-
pleased because they thought the size of the fees indicated a possibility
that the fees sheltered a sham transaction. In addition, Congress was
268. See supra note 63.
269. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 61, 74-76 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 140-148 and accompanying text.
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reacting after the defendant had been found guilty. The frustration may
have reflected a value judgment that a guilty defendant does not deserve
the representation provided by attorneys charging large fees. Had the
defendant in question been acquitted, would Congress' reaction toward
the amount of attorneys' fees have been the same? Perhaps the money
would have been regarded as well-spent.
Perhaps the frustration with large fees can be attributed to more
basic motivations. It may simply be difficult for some people to believe
that an attorney can earn, by legitimate means, exorbitant fees. This con-
cept is illustrated by the remarks of one government commentator: "I
would hate to think that I would have to sell my time at what it is truly
worth, rather than what I can command when working on RICO and
CCE cases."275 Any number of motives could be hidden behind the frus-
tration expressed in this passage. This does not necessarily mean, how-
ever, that Congress would act to infringe upon a defendant's right to
counsel of choice based on this frustration.
B. The Majority Does Not Give Sufficient Weight to the Burdens the
Statutes Impose on a Defendant's Fifth and Sixth
Amendment Rights
The majority placed too little weight on the burden defendants suf-
fer when the statutes take away their ability to pay legitimate fees. When
the majority said appointed counsel was adequate,276 it completely ig-
nored the complexity and length of an average RICO or CCE trial. The
average criminal trial simply does not take either the time or resources
required by a RICO or CCE trial.277 The appointed counsel's compe-
tency is not in question. At present rates of compensation for appointed
attorneys, and with current limits on funding for investigative or expert
services,"' it is unlikely that an extensive investigation of the case will be
achieved. Thus, the result of a statute that unnecessarily renders defend-
ants constructively indigent is added weight to an already overburdened
court system.279 "Can we seriously contend that a proper balance would
be effected in such cases by giving a defendant, made Indigent' by the
Government's assertion of a potential forfeiture claim, a young attorney
from an underfunded, overworked public defender's office for the ensuing
275. Blakey, supra note 35, at 790.
276. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
277. For example, the Monsanto trial lasted four and one-half months. The hearing to
determine whether the Government had sufficient probable cause to believe the defendant's
assets would be forfeitable took four days.
278. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
279. Greenhalgh & Hughes, The Assistance of Counsel Clause in the Year 2000, 25 CRIM.
L. BULL. 86, 110-11 (1989).
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6-15 month trial?"'28
A public policy argument may be made that there are simply inade-
quate resources, either in attorneys or in dollars, to meet such an in-
creased demand. This burden on the system will affect all defendants,
not just RICO and CCE defendants, because the time required by the
more complex cases will reduce the time available for other cases. It is
unlikely that the assets recovered through forfeiture will be used to rem-
edy this situation. Finally, the forfeiture of attorneys' fees is not efficient.
Time is added to every case in which the government seeks forfeiture. If
the court requires a hearing to establish probable cause before it will is-
sue a protective order, a portion of trial time that could be better spent
on substantive issues will be spent arguing the merits of the forfeiture.
Contrary to the majority's assertion,281 the government actually is
interfering in a defendant's attorney selection. Ultimately, these defend-
ants are impecunious only because the government chooses to character-
ize them as such. The majority gives too much weight to the
government's property interest in forfeitable assets. Unfortunately, the
majority gets tangled in cyclical rhetoric. The government states that it
has an interest in recovering property that does not belong to the defend-
ant.282 This determination, however, cannot be made until a defendant is
convicted. Defendants retain title to their assets unless they are con-
victed. Thus, the government is using a future estimation of guilt to in-
fringe upon a defendant's currently existing rights. When the majority
asserted that a drug dealer does not deserve a better defense than a petty
thief,283 it missed the point. This is illustrated by the majority's failure to
include an important qualifier. The defendant is only an "alleged" drug
dealer. "[T]he right to private counsel of choice guaranteed by the sixth
amendment cannot be made to turn on how bad the particular crime or
criminal may be, but that.., is the linchpin of the majority's constitu-
tional analysis. ' '2  The presumption of innocence must not be
ignored.
285
280. United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 86 (2d Cir. 1987) (Oakes, J., dissenting),
vacated, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc) (per curiam), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
281. See supra notes 168-171 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 180-186 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
284. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637, 652 (4th Cir. 1988)
(en bane) (Phillips, J., dissenting), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
285. One commentator finds the presumption of innocence unduly burdensome:
We are, presumably, attempting to seize assets from bad people. I am not talk-
ing about the presumption of innocence appropriate to trial, but the real world per-
spective of law enforcement: We do not bring cases against people who are in fact
innocent. We do bring cases against people who are presumed to be innocent. But
the government has every reason to believe that in fact they are guilty. Since eighty-
five to ninety percent of the people plead guilty, the government is correct eighty-five
to ninety percent of the time. My point is that most people in the system are, in fact,
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Nor does the majority assign enough importance to the damage
caused to the adversarial system as a whole. The lawyer functions as an
advocate, not as a judge. By forcing attorneys to withdraw when the
source of their fees is suspicious, the government is putting attorneys in
the position of having to judge their client. Guilty as well as innocent
defendants are guaranteed representation under the Constitution.2 86
Additionally, the majority too easily dismissed the ethical norms of
a judicial system where the behavior of attorneys is strictly circumscribed
by professional codes.28 7 Despite the majority's assertion that attorneys
could accept potential RICO and CCE cases on a contingency fee ba-
sis,288 many attorneys would be uncomfortable with such a violation of
established professional conduct.2 8 9 Yet if attorneys follow their con-
science and continue to represent alleged drug dealers and racketeers, the
government may target their clients for forfeiture.290 The willingness of
some to justify the government's use of forfeiture in this manner may be
attributed to the fact that they associate the reputation of attorneys with
the reputation of the defendants they choose to represent.291
Forfeiture is a powerful weapon that gives increased leverage to the
prosecution at the expense of the defense. The government is given a
"negative, indeed an unwholesome, power over the defendant's choice of
counsel in the very type of complex criminal case where astute, exper-
ienced counsel is most needed. ' 292 If a defendant cannot be convicted in
the old-fashioned way, with sufficient evidence to convince a jury of his
or her guilt, our criminal justice system requires that the defendant go
free. The fact that the government may not be able to meet its burden of
proof in all the cases it brings to trial does not justify government inter-
ference with a defendant's attorney-selection process.293
The simple fact remains that defendants must be found guilty before
they are punished, not deemed guilty by the government because of the
nature of the offense with which they are charged. Government entitle-
ment to forfeitable assets is something that can only be decided retro-
guilty. And if we wait until the conclusion of the litigation, will there be any assets
there to seize?
Blakey, supra note 35, at 786.
286. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
287. See supra notes 193-197 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
291. "[T]hey need lawyers to keep the law off their backs. They need house counsel to
make possible their day-to-day operations; they need corrupt lawyers to make possible their
operations." Blakey, supra note 35, at 785.
292. United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 86 (2d Cir. 1987) (Oakes, J., dissenting),
vacated, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988) (en bane) (per curiam), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
293. See supra notes 251-254 and accompanying text.
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spectively, not prospectively. Thus, the majority is not convincing in its
determination that the statutes do not violate rights guaranteed by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
C. Future Directions
The Court left open the possibility that due process may require a
hearing before a permanent restraining order is issued. Future chal-
lenges based on this issue can be expected. Even with a hearing, how-
ever, the same problems exist. The question still remains as to who will
represent the defendant at such a hearing, a "pre-trial mini-trial" in it-
self.29 4 The threat of forfeiture affects not only the individual defendant,
but also a specific class of defendants.295 Attorneys, like most other
working people, will avoid cases in which there is a risk they will not be
paid. Certain defendants will find private representation more difficult to
obtain. In addition, the showing required at such hearings is not a heavy
burden of proof. The government should have no difficulty meeting the
probable cause standard in most cases.296 As a practical matter this
means that every time the government seeks forfeiture it will achieve its
objective. An announcement of government intention to seek forfeiture
in a specific case thereby becomes a warning to the attorney not to repre-
sent the potential client.297
Some commentators are troubled that successful criminals have ac-
cess to a better defense than they deserve and resent that "[t]he rights of
poor people charged with crime have a life only in the rhetoric of the
system .... "29 As one commentator remarks: "We are not troubled
when poor people charged with complex crimes have to be represented
by public defenders. It escapes me why we should be concerned when
this happens to those who are illegally rich through committing
crimes." '299 The right to counsel of choice "obviously cannot be taken
literally and at best can mean counsel of choice for the rich."' "°° These
are existing problems within the system. The question is what to do
about them. Do we address the anomalies of the system by eliminating
private defense in the pursuit of equal treatment? Should some defend-
ants be deprived of their constitutional right to choose an attorney be-
cause others do not have equal access? Or should our society change
priorities and provide resources to increase representation for all
defendants?
294. Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 86-87 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
295. Id. at 86.
296. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 251-253 and accompanying text.
298. Greenhalgh & Hughes, supra note 279, at 111.
299. Id at 109.
300. Id.
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Perhaps the best thing that could occur would be for Congress to
clarify the statutes. Both the majority and the dissent have called for
guidance.3"1 In the words of one commentator: "Congressional intent
has been one of the major problems in interpretation of the Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act."302 Congress could end these problems by
amending the statutes to contain an express exemption for attorneys'
fees. Unfortunately, this is unlikely given the public perception of crimi-
nal defendants. The sad fact may be that until attorneys' fee forfeiture
infringes upon the rights of a more sympathetic type of defendant, such
as a white-collar RICO defendant, the current abuses of the statutes may
be tolerated and even deemed an acceptable sacrifice in this "war" on
crime.
V. Conclusion
This Comment has traced the history of the Comprehensive Forfei-
ture Act of 1984 in an attempt to provide background for the debate over
attorneys' fee forfeiture. The various approaches taken by the federal
courts also have been examined.' A number of these positions were
adopted by either the majority or the dissent in the Supreme Court deci-
sions in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States and United States
v. Monsanto.
Despite the majority's holding that the statutes encompass attor-
neys' fees, there is no express provision in the statutes providing for the
forfeiture of fees, nor does examination of congressional purpose demand
it. Moreover, the majority seemed intent on downplaying the impact of
the infringement that such statutes create upon the rights of individual
defendants and upon the adversarial system as a whole. The majority
placed great weight on the government interest in recovering all forfeit-
able property, even at the expense of depriving defendants of their right
to choice of counsel.
The dissenters, on the other hand, are ultimately more persuasive in
their detailed analysis of the constitutional problems caused by the ma-
jority's interpretation of the statute. The dissenters recognized that cer-
tain realities exist in the criminal-defense field and that these statutes
have the power to alter the criminal defendant's ability to defend against
RICO or CCE charges. Although some areas remain to be explored,
such as whether hearings are required before a court may issue protective
orders restraining assets, the government now has a tool at its disposal
that may fundamentally alter the balance of power in criminal trials.
Congress needs to amend the statutes if the forfeiture of attorneys'
fees was an unforeseen construction of the provisions. Congress must
301. See supra notes 146 & 260 and accompanying text.
302. Wade, supra note 45, at 258.
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move quickly, before the entire fabric of the adversarial system under-
goes drastic change. As Justice Blackmun stated in his dissent: "This
Court has the power to declare the Act constitutional, but it cannot
thereby make it wise."
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